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In the aftermath of the global COVID-19 crisis, whereas many world leaders enacted
swift lockdown orders and robust testing regimes to preserve public health and to
speed up economic recovery, Donald Trump in the United States and Jair
Bolsonaro in Brazil responded to outbreaks by publicly downplaying the signiﬁcance of the crisis and argued that overly restrictive health measures would create
too sizable an economic risk. These two presidents have done much to weaken democracy and trust in government. In this article, we examine the extent to which two
institutions in each country––federalism and the party system––impacted the
ways in which they framed the COVID-19 crisis and policy responses to it in
2020, especially during the ﬁrst months of the pandemic. Our evidence suggests
that each of these institutions provided opportunities for both leaders to reconstruct
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public understandings of the crisis while deﬂecting blame for negative public-health
outcomes.
Keywords: framing, COVID-19, pandemic, crisis response, trump,
bolsonaro, united states, brazil, political institutions.
Trump, Bolsonaro Y Ei Enmarcamiento De La Crisis Del COVID-19:
Cómo Las Instituciones Políticas Conformaron Las Estrategias
Presidenciales
A raíz de la crisis mundial de COVID-19, mientras que muchos líderes mundiales promulgaron órdenes de bloqueo rápidas y regímenes de prueba sólidos
para preservar la salud pública y acelerar la recuperación económica, Donald
Trump en los Estados Unidos y Jair Bolsonaro en Brasil respondieron a los
brotes públicamente minimizando la importancia de la crisis y argumentó que
las medidas sanitarias excesivamente restrictivas crearían un riesgo económico
demasiado grande. Estos dos presidentes han hecho mucho para debilitar la
democracia y la conﬁanza en el gobierno. En este artículo, examinamos hasta
qué punto dos instituciones en cada país –– el federalismo y el sistema de partidos– impactaron la forma en que enmarcaron la crisis del COVID-19 y las
respuestas políticas a la misma en 2020, especialmente durante los primeros
meses de la pandemia. Nuestra evidencia sugiere que cada una de estas instituciones brindó oportunidades para que ambos líderes reconstruyeran la
comprensión pública de la crisis mientras desviaban la culpa por los resultados
negativos de salud pública.
Palabras clave: Encuadramiento, COVID-19, Pandemia, Respuesta a
crisis, Trump, Bolsonaro, Estados Unidos, Brasil, Instituciones políticas
特朗普、博
普、博索纳罗与新冠肺炎危机的建构：政
构：政治制度如何影响总统战略
在全球新冠肺炎（COVID19）危机造成的严重影响下，许多国家领导者
颁布了迅速的封城令和稳健的检测制度，以期保护公共卫生并加速经济
恢复，然而美国总统唐纳德·特朗普和巴西总统雅伊尔·博索纳罗对疫情
爆发所采取的响应却是公开轻视其严重性，并认为过多的限制性卫生措
施将造成严重经济危机。这两位总统的诸多行为都削弱了民主和政府信
任。本文中，我们分析了联邦制和党派系统分别以多大程度影响了两国
在2020年对新冠肺炎危机的建构以及政策响应，尤其是在大流行最初几
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个月里。我们的研究结果暗示，两种制度都为这两位总统提供机会重新
建构关于危机的公共理解，同时为负面公共卫生结果规避责任。
关键词：framing，2019冠状病毒病，大流行，危机响应，特朗普，博
关键词：
索纳罗，美国，巴西，政治制度。

A

s the COVID-19 pandemic reveals, public-health emergencies constitute a threat to service-oriented economies (Brinca, Duarte and Faria e
Castro 2020). Even so, political elites have embraced divergent ideas
about the appropriate relationship between the pandemic and economic
management. In countries as different as Australia, New Zealand, South
Korea, and Singapore, leaders have responded to this reality by prioritizing
public health, enacting swift quarantines, and strong testing regimes.
Indeed, the evidence suggests that these measures have worsened economic outcomes relative to countries with less stringent measures
(Balmford et al. 2020). Yet in others, such as Brazil and the United
States, political leaders have attempted to maintain economic productivity
by downplaying the severity of the crisis, eschewing responsibility for negative public-health outcomes. By the fall of 2020, Presidents Donald
J. Trump and Jair Bolsonaro had paid a personal cost for their leadership
during the pandemic: each had contracted COVID-19.1 In neither case did
these personal experiences alter their general approach to managing the
pandemic, which had made both countries global leaders in conﬁrmed
cases and deaths. In neither country did the virus elicit a shift in the
major ideological frameworks each leader applied in their crisis response.
Trump’s conﬂict with public-health ofﬁcials––while extreme––bore a striking resemblance to prior Republican attacks on science and drew on a
deep reservoir of conservative distrust of scientiﬁc experts (Motta 2021).
Bolsonaro supported revisionist views, challenging the effectiveness of
social distance measures and vaccines and supporting medicines with no
scientiﬁc evidence for COVID-19 treatment (Fonseca et al. 2021). At the
same time, in each of these two countries, this shift took place in a
broader political context where a president sought to weaken democratic
institutions and expert systems to consolidate their power, regardless of

1

On populism seeMudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2017), Müller (2016), and Schneiker
(2020).
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the human and public health cost of this strategy amidst a major global
pandemic.
What distinguishes both the U.S. and Brazilian cases, however, are the
unique conﬁgurations of institutions in both countries that shaped each
leader’s capacity to rhetorically reconstruct the crisis to suit their ends,
deferring blame for deaths while claiming credit for delivering economic
relief (see Weaver 1986). Although Trump and Bolsonaro are exceptional presidents, in this article we argue that their framing strategies
during the COVID-19 crisis reﬂected well-known political strategies and
existing institutional legacies. More speciﬁcally, we examine the role
played by two institutions––federalism and party systems––in providing
a political support structure for the idea espoused by both Trump and
Bolsonaro that strong public health measures would hurt the strength
of the national economy. The analysis of framing processes surrounding
a deadly pandemic such as COVID-19 also allows us to gauge the actual
impact of these processes on public policies that can save or endanger
people’s lives and livelihoods. Thus, any analysis of framing processes
must circle back to the broad human consequences of political discourses
and strategies which, in the case of both presidents, have been disastrous.
Empirically, the present article analyzes the public statements of
Presidents Trump and Bolsonaro (speeches, press conferences, media interviews, and Tweets) during the ﬁrst year of the COVID-19 crisis (2020), with a
particular focus on their initial responses to the pandemic. The objective of
this analysis is to elucidate the relationship between their statements and
speciﬁc blame avoidance and credit claiming strategies embedded in U.S.
and Brazilian political institutions, especially federalism and the party
system. More concretely, the analysis explores the framing of speciﬁc
policy alternatives such as conﬁnement and economic stimulus in the
context of a rapidly evolving pandemic, which soon became a contested
crisis in these two countries with multiple meanings and ramiﬁcations. As
suggested below, in the institutional context of federalism and partisan politics, both Presidents Trump and Bolsonaro attempted to exploit this situation to deﬂect blame for the growing number of COVID-19 victims while
claiming credit for their plans to foster a swift reopening of the economy.
Four main sections comprise the remainder of this article. First, we
formulate an ideational-institutional theoretical framework about
framing contests and political strategies during crises. Second, we
explore the presidential framing of COVID-19 in the United States.
Third, we turn to the presidential framing of the pandemic in Brazil.
Fourth, using our ideational-institutional framework, we compare the
two countries directly to stress the similarities and differences between
416
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them before summarizing the main ﬁndings of this study and sketching
an agenda for future research.
Framing, Credit Claiming, and Blame Avoidance
As we argue here, under Trump and Bolsonaro, the COVID-19 crisis
in these two federal countries has led ﬁrst and foremost to traditional
framing contests shaped by existing political institutions: namely, federalism and party systems. Thus, this section focuses primarily on the framing
of collective threats and how they interact with these political institutions.
A central aspect of crises is how political actors frame collective threats
while pursuing blame avoidance and credit claiming strategies. This is the
case because these actors can affect the ways in which such collective
threats are perceived to advance their political and policy goals (Béland
2007; Rojecki 2016). To understand how this is possible, we turn to the
literature on framing processes, before discussing their relationship to
blame avoidance and credit claiming strategies.
First, frames are simply “symbols and concepts” (Campbell 2004, 94)
used by political actors to shape the perception of reality and promote
their political and policy agenda (on framing processes see also
Benford and Snow 2000; Schön and Rein 1994). As understood here,
the frames political actors deploy are strategic in nature because they
are used to win electoral and policy battles “that are dialogical in
nature in the sense that actors respond to their opponents by putting
forward alternative frames to attack them and weaken support for their
policy solutions” (Béland 2019, 20). These remarks stress the interactive
character of framing processes, which are a form of strategic political discourse (Schmidt 2008). Because of their strategic nature, framing processes as studied in this article are inseparable from the actors who
produce them. In other words, the analysis of these processes, just like
the studies of ideational processes more generally, is necessarily actorcentric and grounded in a recognition of the agency of political actors,
who combine existing cultural and ideological repertoires to produce
certain strategic effects (Campbell 2004).
Second, during crises and beyond, frames are regularly employed in
the blame-avoidance and credit-claiming strategies of political actors
(see Weaver 1986, 2018). According to Kent Weaver (2018, 260), blame
avoidance refers to how political actors seek to minimize their own
“responsibility for unpopular actions taken.” As for the concept of
credit claiming, it refers to how political actors seek to claim responsibility
for popular actions and positive outcomes (Weaver 1986).
WINTER 2021
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There is strong evidence that, during crises, framing contests among
political actors—to deﬁne collective threats and legitimize policy
responses to them—mesh with the concrete blame avoidance and
credit claiming strategies of these actors. As Boin, ‘t Hart and
McConnell (2009, 181) claim, crises “generate framing contests to interpret events, their causes, and the responsibilities and lessons involved in
ways that suit their political purposes and visions of future policy directions.” This quote points back to the role of perceptions during crises
and how political actors ﬁght one another over the ways in which both collective threats and policy responses to them are framed. In the case of
public health crises, across different political regimes, information
control and expert advice are likely to play a direct role in the framing
contests over the nature of the collective threats at hand and the potential
policy responses to them involving political actors pursuing concrete
political strategies, including blame avoidance strategies (Baekkeskov
and Rubin 2017).
The ways in which these framing contests and political strategies
unfold during crises are shaped by broader institutional legacies that
set up the speciﬁc “rules of the game” that political actors must navigate
to gain power and score electoral points. In the case of the United States
and Brazil, federalism and the party system are central institutional
factors shaping framing contests and related political strategies.
First, federalism diffuses power vertically by constitutionally guaranteeing the institutional autonomy of subnational entities, which play a
direct role in many policy areas. Federal actors such as the president
could blame subnational actors for negative policy outcomes during a
crisis but also that, second, these actors can accuse the president and
the federal government more generally of incompetence or wrongdoing
to avoid taking responsibilities for policy failures that require intergovernmental cooperation. Conversely, federalism can blur the responsibility for
“good news,” which facilitates credit-claiming attempts on the part of
political actors located at different orders of government (Weaver 1986;
on federalism and blame avoidance see Brown 2010; Maestas et al.
2008). This remark should not hide key differences between the two
federal systems under consideration, as the U.S. system is more decentralized on average than the Brazilian one, something especially apparent in
the ﬁeld of health care.
Second, the vertical integration of political parties in federal systems
and the relationship between existing parties and the president in
power is another crucial institutional factor that may affect the ways in
which framing contests and political strategies unfold during a crisis
418
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(see Ware 1995). In the case of Presidents Trump and Bolsonaro, we have
two right-wing populist leaders who seek to foster political support from
their base while seriously weakening democracy and public trust in government. Yet, President Trump is afﬁliated with the Republican Party,
which has existed since the mid-nineteenth century as one of the two
parties that dominate electoral politics in the United States. However
internally divided and weakly institutionalized American parties are,
party identiﬁcation in the electorate remains strong (Azari 2016).
Hence, Trump’s support from the Republican Party in 2020 helps
explain why he remained a highly competitive presidential candidate
against Democrat Joe Biden, even if the latter ended up winning. As for
President Bolsonaro, in the context of a more fragmented and weakly
embedded party system, he has proved much more isolated since the
failure of his Alliance for Brazil back in 2019, a situation that puts him
in a vulnerable position vis-à-vis both subnational leaders (governors
and mayors) and the National Congress. This is key as it pushed
Bolsonaro to negotiate support with members of the National Congress.
In the following analysis, the features of federalism and the party
system in each country are taken into consideration to analyze the
framing and political strategies of Presidents Trump and Bolsonaro
during the ﬁrst months of the COVID-19 crisis. At this stage, a few methodological remarks about our empirical analysis are necessary. First, the
rationale for our case selection is rather straightforward: the United
States and Brazil are two federal presidential systems that have each
been hit particularly hard by the COVID-19 crisis, as suggested below.
Second, in both countries, the president played a central and controversial political role during the crisis. Third, Presidents Trump and
Bolsonaro use a harsh, confrontational rhetoric against their enemies,
which increased political tensions in each country during the
COVID-19 crisis. Finally, despite these similarities, the existence of key
institutional differences between the two countries allows us to see
whether and how distinct institutional legacies (regarding federalism
and the party system) shape the framing and political strategies of
these two presidents.
In this article, we use a qualitative comparative case-study design to
identify and explain key similarities and differences between the two
countries under consideration. To analyze framing processes, we study
the political discourse of each president as formulated in social media
content, ofﬁcial speeches, and press conferences, among other primary
sources. To link these framing processes to concrete blame-avoidance
and credit-claiming strategies, we use a qualitative process tracing
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approach grounded in a systematic reading of both media accounts and
academic literature on the two presidents and their respective countries
and how they have handled the COVID-19 crisis. As for the timeframe
of the analysis, we concentrate primarily on the ﬁrst months of the
crisis (especially from March to June 2020), as this period was especially
crucial in terms of the framing contests over the pandemic, in part
because COVID-19 was at the center of political discourse in both countries at the time.
United States
International rankings released prior to the pandemic suggested that
the U.S. public health system was highly equipped to deal with COVID-19.
Indeed, the United States ranked ﬁrst among 195 countries on pandemic
preparedness (NTI 2019). Yet, in contrast to these strong rankings, the
U.S. political economy had deep defects that made collective action
during a pandemic quite difﬁcult. Institutionally, the public health
authority in the United States remained highly decentralized, allowing
for buck-passing from the federal government to state and local ofﬁcials.
Politically, partisan elites were starkly polarized––including on questions
of public health and the role of experts––and public trust in government
hovered at an all-time low (Pew Research Center 2021). Nevertheless,
faith in the president among co-partisans in the electorate appeared
buoyant to any number of prior crises (Gallup 2021).
Hence a Republican president, especially a ﬁgure like Trump, had few
short-term political incentives to adopt a highly precautionary response to
the pandemic. At the start of 2020, President Trump’s hopes for
re-election centered on the growing economy. In the State of the
Union address delivered at the start of February the president proclaimed, “The unemployment rate is the lowest in over half a century.
And very incredibly, the average unemployment rate under my administration is lower than any administration in the history of our country”
(Trump 2020a). While Trump misrepresented the economic data, it
was true that the ofﬁcial unemployment rate at the end of 2019 was a longterm low of 3.5 percent (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2020). For a president
seeking re-election, this was a positive news. By this stage, COVID-19 was a
known quantity and Trump had already put in place measures restricting
travel from China to the United States and cases had already been
reported in Washington state. Further, although it was not known until
late April, the ﬁrst COVID-19 related death in the United States occurred
two days after Trump’s speech on February 6 (Chapell 2020). Through
420
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February, however, Trump dismissed concerns that COVID-19 might
disrupt American life. In September 2020 it became evident that
President Trump knew at the start of February that COVID-19 was
highly transmissible and posed a serious risk (Woodward 2020), but in
a series of public statements through February and into March the president ignored the emerging scientiﬁc consensus and repeated that the
virus would soon “go away” (Bump 2020).
That prediction proved reckless and, by early July, the United States
had suffered over 130,000 deaths (John Hopkins Coronavirus Resource
Center 2020). Many state governors responded by issuing “shelter in
place” or “stay at home” orders through April and May (see Lee et al.
2020, for state-by-state closings and re-openings). These measures,
along with growing public anxiety, inevitably had severe economic consequences. In the opening quarter of the year GDP fell by 5 percent (BEA
2020), even though economic activity had remained unrestricted through
much of that period. The unemployment rate for May stood at 13
percent, which represented a much sharper and deeper decline than
had even been the case during the Great Recession of 2008 and 2009
(Kocahhar 2020).
In this context, Trump started holding daily press brieﬁngs in an
effort to regain control over the COVID-19 response narrative. From
March 13 onward, Trump held court with the press for 24 straight days.
In the early stages of the pandemic, the president’s intent was to
present himself as a wartime leader against the “invisible enemy.” The
brieﬁngs themselves were seldom brief and were often erratic and confounded logic at times. Yet, amid the mixed messages, what was clear
was that the White House was determined to maximize credit claiming
and deny responsibility for any problems associated with the deteriorating
public health situation. This meant shifting blame for the deteriorating
public health situation through April on to other actors and institutions.
Hence, the president insisted that the pandemic preparedness cupboard
had been left bare by the Obama administration and he also regularly laid
the blame for ongoing problems, such as shortages of necessary medical
equipment, with state authorities.
This blame avoidance strategy was seen at its boldest in a press conference on March 13. When asked about the delay in ramping up the country’s testing capacity for COVID-19, President Trump responded, “I don’t
take responsibility at all.” Furthermore, he defended his administration’s
efforts by condemning the response of the Obama administration to the
H1N1 pandemic in 2009, maintaining, “If you go back — please, if you
go back to the swine ﬂu, it was nothing like this. They didn’t do testing
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like this” (Oprysko 2020). At a press brieﬁng ﬁve weeks later, Trump
elaborated again on why the failings of the previous administration
explained ongoing problems with the roll out of testing: “I started with
an obsolete, broken system from a previous administration,” he then
added, “[u]nfortunately, some partisan voices are attempting to politicize
the issue of testing, which they shouldn’t be doing, because I inherited
broken junk” (Rupar 2020). Through this messaging, Trump was engaging
in what Weaver (2018, 260) describes as “blame generating.” As a narrative,
these statements were targeted at reinforcing the president’s existing base of
support by shifting responsibility for evident failures. This shift represented
a backward-looking form of blame avoidance (i.e., blaming one’s predecessors), simultaneously bringing Obama (one of Trump’s favorite political
foils) and his legacy into play. In blaming his predecessor, Trump’s aim
was to “weaken negative images” of his own (Weaver 2018, 268).
President Trump also mobilized blame-avoidance strategies by
“passing the buck for decision-making to other policymakers” (Weaver
2018, 260): namely, state governors. These criticisms had two distinct
aspects. First, Trump deﬂected worries about shortfalls in testing and
the supply of medical equipment such as ventilators and personal protection equipment away from the federal government and on to the states.
This was founded on the idea that the primary responsibility for tackling
the pandemic did not lie with the federal government in the ﬁrst place.
Second, as the administration’s focus shifted from combatting the virus
to re-opening the economy the president attacked those governors he
saw as too slow to ease lockdown restrictions. Emboldening Trump’s
move here was the structure of American ﬁscal federalism itself, speciﬁcally state and local governments’ inability to deﬁcit spend. By refusing
to sign legislation with general aid for state and local revenues, Trump
forced states to choose between reopening their economies, accepting
higher rates of infection and mortality, or enduring massive budget deﬁcits (Rocco et al., 2020).
Notably, Trump’s rhetorical strategy on economic reopening was not
simply about “passing the buck” to the states but was underpinned by partisan motivation as the attacks concentrated on the actions of Democratic
governors. For example, in mid-April the president said that states were
not using all the testing facilities that they had to hand: “they don’t
want to use all of the capacity that we’ve created. We have tremendous
capacity… They know that. The governors know that. The Democrat governors know that; they’re the ones that are complaining” (White House
2020). Bizarrely, this blame avoidance was interspersed with credit claiming based on praise from some of those very same governors. In mid-April
422
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a video was played at the press brieﬁng that included clips praising the
president’s response to the crisis from prominent Democratic governors:
Andrew Cuomo of New York, Gavin Newsom of California, and Phil
Murphy of New Jersey (Phillips 2020).
These contradictory communications about the president’s relationship with the nation’s governors extended to his public understanding
of federalism. Trump, in fact, brieﬂy claimed that he had the authority
to force states to re-open their economies when attacking governors
who he said were not acting quickly enough. In a tweet, the president
wrote, “For the purpose of creating conﬂict and confusion, some in the
Fake News Media are saying that it is the Governors decision to open
up the states, not that of the President of the United States and the
Federal Government. Let it be fully understood that this is incorrect”
(Forgey and Gerstein 2020). Trump quickly backtracked from this
claim as it was manifestly false, but the urgency of the administration’s
demand that states open as soon as possible contrasted with the White
House’s difﬁdence when governors asked that the federal government
take a greater role in coordinating a response to the pandemic.
The messaging through these crucial months was therefore highly
inconsistent if examined in a logical fashion. Trump veered from claiming absolutist-style authority to asserting that governors should lead the
pandemic effort. He took credit for any progress and placed blame on
others for bad news with little regard for the evidence. Simultaneously,
he claimed to be leading the ﬁght against the “invisible enemy,” yet
played down the threat posed by the virus. But the overarching narrative
had an internal logic, as it constantly found a rationale for blame avoidance and looked for ways of blame generation with regard to other political actors. Further underpinning this messaging was Trump’s insistence
that the economy be unlocked as quickly as possible, directly in deﬁance
of his own administration’s guidelines on when it would be safe for states
to re-open. Again, Democratic governors were a primary target. For
example, on a visit to Maine in early June, the president compared the
state’s governor, Janet Mills, to a “dictator” and told residents “She’s
going to destroy your state” if she did not lift restrictions in time for the
summer tourist season (Whittle and Colvin 2020). Statements such as
this reﬂected how Trump’s focus had switched away from the dangers
of COVID-19 as he concentrated on promoting the notion that the
economy was on a path to recovery and that it was safe to re-open.
Further, even as thousands of Americans were still dying every day in
early to mid-June, Trump insisted that the spread of the virus had been
checked and that the economy was rebounding. In one brieﬁng he
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asserted, “We’ve made every decision correctly” and, while acknowledging that “We may have some embers or some ashes or we may have
some ﬂames coming,” he insisted “we’ll put them out. We’ll stomp
them out” (Trump 2020a). The primary focus was the improvement in
the job numbers announced in June. Talking about the shape of the
recovery Trump declared, “And now we’re opening, and we’re opening
with a bang. And we’ve been talking about the ‘V.’ This is better than a
‘V’; this is a rocket ship.” (Trump 2020a). The same priority was emphasized at another brieﬁng in mid-June, “last month, we added a record 2.5
million jobs. It’s the highest in the history of our country in one month.
That’s the highest number of jobs: 2.5 million. The Dow rose above
26,000 points. And we saw the largest surge in retail sales ever recorded”
(Trump 2020b).
In his remarks, President Trump did refer to the actions taken by
Congress, such as a payment of $1,200 per adult and $500 per dependent
child for people that earned up to $75,000 in 2019 and noted how the
Payment Protection Plan had helped many businesses damaged by the
pandemic. In fact, the major stimulus packages that were enacted by
Congress, notably the CARES Act, which amounted to a nearly $2 trillion
commitment were passed with near unanimous votes in a manner belying
the constant partisan friction in Washington D.C. The White House was
represented in the discussions over the CARES Act primarily by
Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin, with media reports suggesting that
he was willing to make more concessions to Democrats than some
Republicans were comfortable with (Hulse 2020). Pre-existing policy legacies and institutional fragmentation hindered the distribution of monies
promised in these initial economic support packages (Rocco, Béland, and
Waddan 2020), but the spending commitments involved were in line with
‘big’ rather than ‘small’ government visions.
In fact, across the world the response to COVID-19 illustrated the
underlying authority of the state as well as its unmatched ﬁscal capacity
in a way that pushed past conservative principles. Orders to lockdown
and huge, unfunded, spending commitments trespassed against libertarian instincts and established conservative economic orthodoxy. Yet,
despite these tangles, it might be argued that Trump’s campaign in
2016—with its defense of Social Security and Medicare—had shown
that he was not moored to those conservative orthodoxies and that he
might therefore be receptive to continued expansive government intervention if it helped sustain the economy. But, as the crisis evolved,
there was little sign of a coherent set of ideas guiding the White
House’s response, beyond the insistence on an end to ‘stay at home’
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instructions. Furthermore, by the end of June it was increasingly evident
that the initial relatively swift and bipartisan response by Congress was
unlikely to be sustained in the longer term. For example, the House
did pass a further stimulus package known as the HEROES Act, which
offered a further $3 trillion in aid packages, but did so along partisan
lines as Republicans in both Congress and the White House denounced
the bill as a liberal fantasy (Cochrane 2020).
That the president engaged in blame avoidance in an election year
over life-and-death issues is hardly surprising. Further, the problem of
specifying quite where responsibility lies given the complexities of intergovernmental relationships in the United States makes it plausible to
shift responsibility for poor outcomes. As Hood (2010, 5) notes,
“Crooked and ambiguous accountability trails may not serve democracy
or good governance. But they can protect the political and administrative
class from blame after failure.” Also, while institutional fragmentation in
Washington D.C. can be frustrating and presidents will often blame
Congress for inaction, especially if one or both chambers are controlled
by the opposition party, the relatively quick legislative action as the crisis
developed allowed Trump to claim credit. When signing the CARES Act,
Trump (2020c) said “This is a very important day. I’ll sign the singlebiggest economic relief package in American history and, I must say, or
any other package, by the way. It’s twice as large as any relief ever
signed.” At that point, the president acknowledged the co-operation of
the Democrats, but as the death toll rose through April and May the partisan ﬁnger-pointing became sharper and the normal institutional barriers to legislative action came back into view.
In the ﬁnal stages of the presidential campaign, as the infection rate
across the United States hit new highs, Trump shifted blame for public
anxiety about COVID-19 on to the media. At a rally in North Carolina,
he insisted: “That’s all I hear about now. Turn on television, ‘Covid,
Covid, Covid, Covid, Covid, Covid,’…By the way, on November 4, you
won’t hear about it anymore” (Berenson and Bennett 2020). Yet,
overall, when discussing the blame avoidance and blame-generating
and credit-claiming strategies employed by the White House through
the opening months of the COVID-19 crisis, it is important to note that
these were largely unsuccessful in political terms, at least if measured
by Trump’s popular support. While Trump gained a slightly larger
share of the popular vote than he did in 2016, his Democratic rival—
former Vice President Joe Biden––ultimately won a decisive majority in
both the popular vote and the electoral college. True to form, however,
Trump refused to concede, spreading myths about massive voter fraud,
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ﬁling baseless lawsuits, and pressuring state election ofﬁcials to recalculate vote tallies. This culminated in the extraordinary scenes of January
6, 2021, as rioters, claiming to act on Trump’s behalf, stormed the
Capitol Building to prevent the certiﬁcation of the Electoral College
vote. By that point, Trump paid minimal attention to COVID-19, even
as 4,000 Americans died from the infection on the day of the insurrection.
Hence, even as the country was gripped by crisis, the patterns of partisan
division and institutional fragmentation that confused lines of responsibility not only persisted but were exacerbated by the White House’s
emerging political strategies.
Brazil
Brazil’s health care system was relatively well prepared to deal with the
COVID-19 pandemic for two reasons. First, the Unique Health Care
System (Sistema Único de Saúde, SUS) was institutionalized through different changes promoted since the approval of the 1988 Constitution to
ensure health care universalization and promote coordination in
service provision (Viana et al. 2008). Second, Brazil had a legacy of successful public health responses to crises such as HIV (Nunn 2009). Yet,
the Ministry of Health’s role in national coordination, an important
feature of SUS, as health care decision-making is highly centralized, has
been weakened since the beginning of Bolsonaro’s government. Even
though states and municipalities play a key role in service provision, the
absence of national coordination created challenges for the coordination
of governmental responses during the COVID-19 pandemic (Abrucio
et al. 2020).
In the ﬁrst months of 2020, Bolsonaro was starting his second year as
president of Brazil. Since the beginning of his presidency in early January
2019, Bolsonaro had faced challenges in having the National Congress
approve his legislative proposals. Back in January 2019, he had signiﬁcant
support of the newly elected members of the National Congress, but he
had not built a coalition with other parties and lost support there over
time, especially when left the Social Liberal Party (Partido Social Liberal,
PSL). Although the presidency has powers over setting the national
agenda (Figueiredo and Limongi 1995), it must build a coalition that
involves negotiations and distribution of “goods” such as cabinet positions
due to the highly fragmented nature of the legislature (Raile, Pereira and
Power 2011). As a result, by the time the social security reform (one of the
major changes made in 2019) was ﬁnally adopted, the executive’s proposal had been heavily revised by the National Congress. Moreover,
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President Bolsonaro had not advanced key issues related to both his conservative and liberal agendas.
The COVID-19 pandemic emerged within a context of stagnant economic growth and rising unemployment, which were both aggravated
by the economic and ﬁscal crises the pandemic caused. Considering
this dire pre-existing economic situation in the country, President
Bolsonaro feared the pandemic’s negative economic and ﬁscal impacts.
As he said at the beginning of March 2020, as the threat of the global pandemic became increasingly direct: “if the economy sinks, my government
will end, any government would end” (Bolsonaro, quoted in Vasconcelos
2020). The impact COVID-19 could have on the economy led him to minimize its relevance, saying that “it is just a ﬂu,” “other ﬂus killed more
people,” and “a lot of what people are saying about it is fantasy”
(Bolsonaro, quoted in Vasconcelos 2020). He delegitimized media coverage, insisting that COVID-19 was not as bad as the media had made it
look. The president stopped speaking to the press and, instead, started
to address his supporters directly in front of his cabinet ofﬁce. He also
publicly opposed physical distancing and the closure of schools and businesses, denying international guidelines and scientiﬁc evidence. Instead,
he only supported physical isolation for elderly people and other at-risk
individuals, as the others should “go back to normal” so that “jobs
should be maintained, people’s income should be preserved”
(Bolsonaro 2020). Reinforcing this message, he himself attended a
public demonstration organized by his supporters, who backed the
closure of the National Congress and Supreme Court.
From the end of January until the beginning of March (when Brazil had
252 suspected cases) states and municipal governments in jurisdictions with
high infection rates such as São Paulo took the lead, elaborating public
health plans and creating committees with the support of the federal
Ministry of Health. After being notiﬁed of the ﬁrst cases, state governors
and mayors promoted physical isolation by telling residents to stay home
while restricting economic activities. This was followed by more restrictive
measures, including closing schools and non-essential businesses. As the
virus spread, other states and municipalities across the country followed
suit. States and municipalities also spearheaded efforts to increase hospital
capacity and acquire testing material and health care equipment, especially
respirators (see Pereira, Oliveira and Sampaio 2020).
While states took the lead in responding to the pandemic, political conﬂict between them and President Bolsonaro emerged. At this point, he was
more concerned with deploying blame avoidance, shifting blame to governors for both the economic downturn and the increase in the number of
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COVID-19 deaths and infections. He also stated that governors and mayors
were overacting to the public health crisis: “certain governors are taking
extreme measures that are not within their power such as closing airports,
roads, malls, and street markets” (Bolsonaro, quoted in Vasconcelos 2020).
National decisions, particularly presidential decrees, sought to limit subnational powers or excluded them from decision making. Examples of this
include the Law No. 13,979 (February 6) approved by the National
Executive and Legislature, naming the Ministry of Health as the main
actor in pandemic response and requiring subnational governments to
ask for federal authorization when getting involved in such a response;
the President’s Decree No. 10,282 (March 20) that allowed churches and
other organizations to reopen during the pandemic, contradicting governors and mayors’ pandemic guidelines, which was annulled by the judiciary
a few days after it was issued; the President’s Decree No. 10,289 (March 24)
that created a committee to coordinate and monitor different Ministries’
pandemic initiatives that only included representatives of federal agencies,
thereby excluding states and municipalities; and the President’s Decree No
10,292 (March 25) that granted the federal government exclusive power to
deﬁne regulations for interstate and inter-municipal activities.
Moreover, there was an intensiﬁcation of an ongoing framing and
blame contest between the president and the governors centered on
the issue of who was responsible for the bad economic and public
health news stemming from COVID-19. Even though the federal government transferred state resources for tackling the pandemic to subnational
governments, states complained about delays in receiving respirators,
testing material, and federal funds and demanded increased resources
to alleviate their difﬁcult ﬁscal situation. They also called on the federal
government to suspend the collection of debts and other payments
states make. In this context, the Governor of Rio de Janeiro, Wilson
Witzel, stated that “the Union concentrates revenues, funding” but that
the federal government had to understand that “we need to decentralize
[ﬁscal] resources to states; in this moment, we need liquidity. It is necessary to ensure the federative pact” (Witzel quoted in Caramuru et al.
2020). As for the Governor of Maranhão, Flávio Dino, he claimed that
“yesterday Bolsonaro talked about the ‘pact’ but started the day today
by blaming governors for [Brazil’s] economic problems, solutions for
which states depend on the federal government.… Bolsonaro should
allow the Ministry of Health to coordinate a uniﬁed national action
plan based on technical criteria” (Dino, quoted in Moraes 2020).
At this point, against the president, the federal Ministry of Health took
the lead in supporting state and municipal decisions. Minister Luz
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Henrique Mandetta became the most important actor during this
episode, giving updates to the media at daily press brieﬁngs. He supported the creation of a “favorable environment” for cooperation
between the federal government, states, municipalities, and the private
sector (Mandetta, quoted in Cantanhêde 2020). He also contradicted
President Bolsonaro, framing his decisions as evidence-based and,
Bolsonaro’s as anti-expertise. Simultaneously, when President
Bolsonaro advocated for the use of the controversial drug hydroxychloroquine, Mandetta stated: “I only work…with science” (Mandetta, quoted
in Nomura 2020). He also openly criticized President Bolsonaro for
walking in a crowd without wearing a mask while shaking people’s
hands. President Bolsonaro, like President Trump, deﬁed his own
Ministry’s public health guidelines, and, on April 16, 2020, he ﬁred
Mandetta altogether.
After Mandetta’s dismissal, the Ministry of Health’s response to the
pandemic demonstrated a lack of national leadership and coordination
in the public health policy response to the pandemic. Even though
there is a national health system with shared responsibilities between
the three levels of government, the federal dynamics that characterize
the response to the pandemic are similar to those witnessed in the
United States. States and municipalities issued public health guidelines
on their own, without a stronger form of institutionalized coordination.
This fragile coordination enhanced political competition among governors, who fought over issues such as the acquisition of respirators.2
Despite this lack of leadership, in the following months, the president
continued to advocate for the use of hydroxychloroquine and ivermectin,
and the Ministry of Health allowed physicians to recommend these drugs
to treat COVID-19 patients. In mid-late January 2021, in the city of
Manaus (Amazonas), hospitals ran out of oxygen, which immediately
led to hundreds of additional COVID-19 deaths. A few days before this
“complete massacre,” the Minister of Health, Eduardo Pazuello, “an
army general with no medical experience,” had visited the city to
promote the use of these two drugs, instead of addressing the looming
oxygen crisis in the city’s hospitals (Phillips 2021).
However, the determinations of the 1988 Constitution regarding a
decentralized model in which subnational governments are responsible
for health care provision played a role in Brazil. In April 2020, the

2

In 2019, Bolsonaro increased the autonomy of, and competition, among subnational
governments while making unilateral decisions on key issues (Abrucio et al. 2020).
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federal government’s decision that it was responsible for issuing public
health guidelines about “essential” activities and that states and municipalities had a secondary role was revoked by the federal Supreme
Court. The Supreme Court decided that the Union, states, and municipalities have concurrent responsibilities in managing public health
crises. The federal government, the Court ruled, is responsible at the legislative level but it should respect subnational autonomy (Supremo
Tribunal Federal 2020).
Here President Bolsonaro lost on the legal front, but he used the
ruling to avoid blame, stating that the Supreme Court decision had indicated that primary responsibility for tackling the pandemic lay with subnational units (i.e., states and municipalities), not the federal government.
He said that governors and mayors “can re-open Brazil, not me… I do not
have any power. …The Supreme Court said so. What do you want me to
do? The Supreme Court decided: governors and mayors close and open
[Brazil]” (Bolsonaro, quoted in Frazão 2020). The president continued:
“[if you] believe that quarantine, the measures taken by your state are
harming you – the appropriate forum for your complaints is your respective governor” (Bolsonaro, quoted in Frazão 2020). In this context, by the
end of May and the beginning of June, governors and mayors re-opened
or eased lockdown restrictions. It is important to mention that the blame
contest did not end there, as the president publicly criticized state governors about vaccine agreements, especially the case of São Paulo’s governor, who had signed an agreement with a Chinese company.
Another difference with the United States is that, unlike the situation
prevailing there, the blame the Brazilian president put on governors was
not partisan in nature. Regardless of partisan identities, Bolsonaro
blamed all governors for the economic downturn and “passed the buck”
to them and to the mayors, regardless of their partisan afﬁliation. This
reality is related to the temporally changing nature of President
Bolsonaro’s own partisan identity. At the time of his election to the presidency in October 2018, Bolsonaro was afﬁliated with the PSL.3 He left
the party at the end of 2019 and tried to create a new party, the Alliance
for Brazil, which failed. This means that he was not afﬁliated to a political
party during the ﬁrst months of the pandemic. Though only two governors
were afﬁliated with the PSL, during the 2018 elections half of the 26 governors had declared support for Bolsonaro’s candidacy. However, he lost

3

Although the PSL emerged in 1994, it only became relevant in 2018, when Bolsonaro
was afﬁliated to it.
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some of this support during the pandemic, and almost all governors criticized or opposed his statements and decisions at one point or another,
regardless of the differences in their own public health decisions (i.e.,
more or less restrictive) (Pereira, Oliveira and Sampaio 2020).
President Bolsonaro also claimed credit for the Auxílio Emergencial
(Emergency Beneﬁt) for individuals who had lost their income during
the pandemic approved in beginning of April, a result of the National
Congress’ efforts. The federal government opposed the initial proposal
of transferring 200 reais ($35 USD) per month to citizens. Despite this
opposition, at the end of March, the National Congress approved the
beneﬁt of 500 reais ($86 USD). The federal government then increased
it to 600 reais ($104 USD) a month and sought to claim credit for the
policy, and the federal government extended payments until December
2020, with a reduced amount from September to December. In April,
more than 40 million people received the beneﬁt, and by August, this
number increased to 67 million.
By the end of April 2020, President Bolsonaro was politically isolated.
The National Congress approved bills that he had initially opposed, such
as the Emergency Beneﬁt and Law No. 173 (passed May 27, 2020), which
offered ﬁnancial relief to subnational governments. At the same time, the
National Congress rejected various executive orders (Medidas Provisórias,
MP). President Bolsonaro also feared the National Congress would initiate impeachment proceedings against him because the body had received
multiple requests to do so. Brazil’s multiparty system played a role in
changing Bolsonaro’s precarious situation, allowing him to negotiate
with Congress members linked to centrist parties.
Amidst all of this political posturing and strategic framing, the
number of COVID-19 infections and deaths in Brazil kept increasing.
By August 2020, the number of reported COVID-related deaths stabilized
to approximately 1,000 per day, and there was still considerable underreporting. According to Barberia and Gómez (2020), “playing to the
public’s fears during a pandemic does not seem to have strengthened
his political support and authority.” Yet it seemed that Bolsonaro’s strategies served to maintain his support levels. If Bolsonaro lost supporters in
the ﬁrst months of the pandemic due to the federal government’s problematic policy responses, he gained other supporters “attributed to the
emergency aid money given out during the pandemic” (Gomes 2020).
Moreover, when the country reached a total of 100,000 COVID-19
deaths in August 2020, only 11 percent of Brazilians stated that they
blamed President Bolsonaro for this negative outcome while 47 percent
did not believe Bolsonaro was responsible for it (DataFolha 2020). This
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suggests that, during the ﬁrst months of the pandemic at least, presidential framing strategies proved quite successful in blurring accountability
lines and avoiding blame for almost half of Brazilians, even though, at
the beginning of 2021, he lost support and more Brazilians blamed him
for the increasing number of COVID-19 deaths, the crisis in Manaus,
and the delays in vaccination.
Discussion
Our comparative analysis reveals that, in their framing strategies,
both President Trump and Bolsonaro emphasized the economic
menace posed by the public-health response to COVID-19 while deemphasizing the public-health threat itself. These approaches had tremendous human and policy consequences while leading to dramatic,
yet country-speciﬁc, political conﬂict shaped by distinct institutional
legacies tied to federalism and the party system. In other words,
despite the exceptional nature of their presidencies, both Trump and
Bolsonaro relied on traditional political strategies embedded in existing institutional legacies.
First, regarding federalism, in both countries framing contests and
blame games took place between the president and subnational
leaders, especially governors. In the United States as well as Brazil, the
president blamed subnational leaders for the COVID-related economic
downturn because of their allegedly excessive public health measures.
Simultaneously, as the death toll increased in each country, these presidents blamed governors and sometimes mayors for the situation, a
reality made possible by the accountability challenges stemming from federalism as an institutional framework. In Brazil, the shared public health
responsibilities among the three orders of government (federal, state,
and municipal) as well as the Supreme Court’s decision that reiterated
them also blurred accountability lines. Overall, in both the United
States and Brazil, federalism shaped framing contests and the blame
games they reﬂected and ampliﬁed.
Second, and relatedly, partisanship played a major structuring role in
how both leaders engaged in framing contests. Yet, while federalism
accounts for key similarities between the two countries, the divergence in
party systems helps to explain differences between them as far as the presidential framing of the COVID-19 crisis is concerned. On one hand, in the
United States, partisanship in the form of the Democratic-Republican
dichotomy shaped framing contests and blame games involving the president and subnational actors. This is the case because the Republican
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president mainly attacked Democratic governors and vice versa. In the
United States, such a close relationship between federalism and partisanship
in the politics of blame is a well-documented trend that long preceded the
advent of the Trump administration, in normal times and during crises
(Brown 2010; Maestas et al. 2008). On the other hand, in Brazil, partisanship
played a much more limited role in framing contests. This is tied to the fact
that the party system in Brazil is much more unstable and fragmented than
the system of ‘weak parties and strong partisanship’ found in the United
States (Azari 2016). Such a chaotic situation made it possible for
President Bolsonaro to change party afﬁliation or even govern as an independent, something that would be unlikely to happen in the United
States. This partisan reality changes the rules of the blame games and
framing contests by making President Bolsonaro particularly vulnerable to
attacks coming from different sides of the political spectrum, at both the
national and the subnational level. Conversely, the fact that he did not
belong to any political parties allowed him to both criticize all the governors
and to strike deals with various members of the National Congress, regardless of partisan afﬁliation. In terms of framing contests and blame games,
President Bolsonaro’s lack of partisan afﬁliation during the ﬁrst months
of the pandemic was thus both a curse and a blessing
A focus on the framing strategies of both presidents reveals how gaps
in leadership can accentuate the weaknesses, and undermine the
strengths, of political institutions’ crisis-response capacity. In both the
United States and Brazil, however, that leadership and communication
was not forthcoming through 2020. In an analysis published in the
British Medical Journal in 2019, a team investigated national preparedness
for an infectious disease epidemic or pandemic (Oppenheim et al. 2019).
The results showed ﬁve levels of preparedness, with the United States in
the top rank and Brazil in the second. Critical to these rankings were
assessments of public health and physical infrastructure. Also central
were what the authors describe as ‘institutional capacity’ and ‘public
health communication.’ The former reﬂected on public administration
systems and their capacity for implementing policy quickly and effectively.
The latter required “effective systems to identify salient information gaps
(or potentially hazardous rumors and misinformation), craft and adapt
messaging and rapidly disseminate it to the population” (Oppenheim
et al. 2019, 4). In both regards the leadership of Trump and Bolsonaro,
by adopting political strategies that focused on what they perceived to
be their personal advantage rather than promoting good governance,
undermined institutional capacity and turned the potential strengths of
federalism into weaknesses. Trump’s and Bolsanaro’s contestation of
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the evidence and the resultant contradictory public advice led to disjointed implementation of public health measures. In the U.S. case,
while some Republicans did break from Trump in unambiguously
acknowledging the public health threat of COVID-19, partisan polarization mostly further reinforced the different messages coming from state
leaders. Brazil exhibited a less starkly two-dimensional partisan messaging, but this did not lead to a uniform narrative about the balance of
risk caused by COVID-19. Bolsonaro’s was the most loudly expressed
opinion but the multiple voices criticizing and sometimes supporting
him undermined the chance of consistent communication in a system
with dispersed political authority embedded throughout federalism.
The gravity of the COVID-19 crisis did not displace the framing contests and blame games that have become a dominant feature of presidential politics in the United States and Brazil over the last few
decades. In fact, if anything, it provided ample opportunity for opportunistic political leaders to leverage party systems and federal structures
to reassign blame and turn the crisis into a political cleavage. While
Trump and Bolsonaro did much to weaken democracy and reduce
trust in government, their behavior and framing strategies during a
pandemic they both mismanaged in a deadly fashion suggest that
they still relied on rather traditional tactics deeply embedded in existing political institutions. This is a reality that future research on these
two presidents and, more broadly, on framing processes in times of
crisis should keep front and center.
Theoretically, the above analysis points to the fact that existing political
institutions, including federalism and party systems, shape the framing
strategies of political leaders, during crises and beyond them. Although
political leaders have the autonomy and pursue their own strategies, political institutions create constrains and opportunities for them, a reality consistent with institutionalist approaches to politics and framing processes
(Campbell 2004; Schmidt 2008). Our analysis suggests that even political
leaders such as Trump and Bolsonaro, who attempt to weaken and sometimes even subvert democratic institutions, adopt framing strategies that
reﬂect at least in part the enduring weight of these very institutions.
Future comparative scholarship on framing processes during and beyond
global crises would beneﬁt from taking these ﬁndings into account.
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